On October 2, 2026, Case Law I.15o.C. J/1 C (12a.) of the Fifteenth Collegiate Court for Civil Matters of the First Circuit was published in the Federal Judicial Weekly. Pursuant to paragraph eight of General Plenary Agreement 7/2025 (12a.), it is mandatory as of October 5. The ruling establishes that credit institutions must provide security to obtain a stay of execution of final judgments in direct amparo proceedings, notwithstanding the exemption provided for in Article 86 of the Credit Institutions Law. This legal precedent was established through reiteration based on five appeals resolved unanimously between July 2025 and March 2026, all filed by banking institutions challenging the requirement to provide security imposed by the competent authority.
The ruling is not novel in terms of its outcome. It is, however, novel in terms of its timing and the legal technicalities it brings back into the spotlight.
An antinomy in the strict sense
Article 86 of the Credit Institutions Act leaves no room for interpretation: members of the Mexican banking system, unless they are in liquidation or bankruptcy, are considered to be of proven solvency and are not required to post deposits or statutory bonds, “not even in order to obtain a stay of the actions challenged in amparo proceedings.” This is not a gap that the interpreter must fill, but rather a provision that expressly addresses the situation and assigns it a consequence opposite to that of Article 190 of the Amparo Law. The latter makes the suspension in direct amparo proceedings, in civil and commercial matters, conditional upon the provision of sufficient security to cover any damages that the interested third party may suffer.
Traditional criteria for resolving conflicts of law do not provide a conclusive answer. The hierarchical criterion, in its classical formulation, does not apply to conflicts between two ordinary federal laws. The principle of specialty leads to a tie: the Credit Institutions Act is a special law by virtue of its subject matter, and the Amparo Act is a special law by virtue of its subject matter. Only the chronological principle clearly favors the 2013 Amparo Act, although the court does not invoke it.
The court’s reasoning: constitutional reservation regarding regulatory legislation
The court resolves the conflict through a different avenue, which can be described as one based on functional hierarchy or statutory reservation. Article 107, Section X, of the Constitution provides that the contested acts may be subject to suspension “in the cases and under the conditions determined by regulatory law.” In other words, the Constitution reserves to the Amparo Law the authority to define the conditions for the preliminary injunction. Consequently, the court concludes that the provisions of the Amparo Law cannot be subordinated to a provision contained in a different law, because it is those provisions that govern the interpretation and application of any other law with respect to constitutional proceedings.
The argument is sound and can be further strengthened in a way not mentioned in the thesis. The Amparo Law itself regulates exemptions from security requirements: Article 7 exempts official legal entities from providing the security required by law from the parties. If the legislature expressly specified who is exempt under the amparo regime, the absence of credit institutions from that list is significant and confirms that an exemption established in a law outside the amparo regime has no effect in that context.
The Applicability of Case Law P./J. 6/92
The court relies on the case law P./J. 6/92 of the Plenary Session of the Supreme Court (Eighth Era), under the heading “CREDIT INSTITUTIONS. ARE REQUIRED TO PROVIDE A GUARANTEE OR COUNTER-GUARANTEE IN CASES INVOLVING SUSPENSION, WHEN A DIRECT AMPARO IS SEEKED,” and maintains that it remains applicable because its content does not conflict with current law, in accordance with Transitory Article 6 of the 2013 Amparo Law.
This raises an observation. If the Plenary’s case law remained in force and was binding on all courts under Article 217 of the Amparo Law, the emergence of a body of case law from a collegiate court on the same issue reveals that the standard was not being applied uniformly, or that financial institutions found grounds to challenge its applicability under the new law. The practical utility of the new legal doctrine lies precisely in expressly putting an end to that debate.
Scope: direct appeal, First Circuit, and a legal rationale that goes beyond that
This criterion has two formal limitations. The first is territorial: pursuant to Article 217 of the Amparo Law, the case law of a collegiate court is binding on the courts within its circuit, with the exception of regional plenary sessions and the collegiate courts themselves. Outside Mexico City, its authority is persuasive, except for the binding nature of Precedent 6/92. The second is substantive: the subject matter and the criterion pertain to direct amparo.
However, the ratio decidendi does not depend on characteristics specific to direct amparo. If the Amparo Law, as mandated by Article 107 of the Constitution, takes precedence over any other law with respect to suspension, this reasoning naturally extends to suspension in indirect amparo and to the system of guarantees set forth in Article 132. It is foreseeable that the argument will extend to that area, and that the issue will ultimately be raised as a conflict of legal interpretations before the competent regional plenary session or the Supreme Court.
It should also be clarified what this criterion does not resolve. Article 86 remains fully effective outside of amparo proceedings—for example, with respect to preliminary injunctions, attachments, or bonds in ordinary proceedings. The ruling does not declare it inapplicable in general; it merely states that the suspension cannot apply in amparo proceedings.
Implications for Litigation with Lending Institutions
For the interested third party, this criterion allows for the suspension to be made conditional on sufficient security and enables the party to challenge, through a complaint, both the failure to establish such security and an insufficient amount. In practice, the amount is typically determined by reference to the statutory commercial interest rate and the likely time required to resolve the amparo proceeding; therefore, it is advisable to provide the necessary information for this calculation at the outset of the proceeding. It also preserves the option of offering a counter-guarantee to secure enforcement, when this is deemed preferable.
For financial institutions, the cost of a stay is no longer zero. This requires them to weigh more carefully whether it is advisable to stay enforcement, especially in cases involving significant amounts, where the direct amparo had, in practice, functioned as a cost-free deferral mechanism.
The privilege under Article 86 is based on a presumption of solvency that the legislature intended to recognize in the banking system. However, the purpose of the stay is not to establish the complainant’s solvency, but rather to compensate the interested third party for the delay in the enforcement of a judgment in its favor. From that perspective, the exemption was difficult to reconcile with the principle of procedural equality and with the right to the enforcement of judgments derived from Article 17 of the Constitution. The court resolved the conflict using the correct legal tool. It remains to be seen whether the same reasoning extends to indirect amparo and whether the standard holds outside the First Circuit.
