Article 86 of the Credit Institutions Act in Light of Suspension in Direct Amparo Proceedings: Commentary on Case Law I.15o.C. J/1 C (12a.)
®Vega Guerrero

On October 2, 2026, Case Law I.15o.C. J/1 C (12a.) of the Fifteenth Collegiate Court for Civil Matters of the First Circuit was published in the Federal Judicial Weekly. Pursuant to paragraph eight of General Plenary Agreement 7/2025 (12a.), it is mandatory as of October 5. The ruling establishes that credit institutions must provide security to obtain a stay of execution of final judgments in direct amparo proceedings, notwithstanding the exemption provided for in Article 86 of the Credit Institutions Law. The precedent was established through reiteration based on five appeals resolved unanimously between July 2025 and March 2026, all filed by banking institutions against the requirement to provide security imposed by the responsible authority.
The ruling is not novel in terms of its outcome. It is, however, novel in its timing and in the legal technicalities it brings back into focus.
A Contradiction in the Strict Sense
Article 86 of the Credit Institutions Law leaves no room for interpretation: members of the Mexican banking system, unless they are in liquidation or bankruptcy, are deemed to be of proven solvency and are not required to post deposits or legal bonds, “not even in order to obtain a stay of the actions challenged in amparo proceedings.” This is not a gap that the interpreter must fill, but rather a provision that expressly refers to the scenario and assigns it a consequence opposite to that of Article 190 of the Amparo Law. The latter makes the suspension in direct amparo proceedings, in civil and commercial matters, contingent upon the provision of sufficient security to cover any damages that the interested third party may suffer.
Traditional criteria for resolving conflicts of law do not offer a conclusive answer. The hierarchical criterion, in its classical formulation, does not apply between two ordinary federal laws. The principle of speciality leads to a tie: the Credit Institutions Act is a special law by virtue of its subject matter, and the Amparo Act is a special law by virtue of its subject matter. Only the chronological principle clearly favors the 2013 Amparo Act, although the court does not invoke it.
The court’s argument: constitutional reservation to regulatory law
The court resolves the conflict through a different approach, which can be described as functional hierarchy or the reservation of law. Article 107, Section X, of the Constitution provides that the contested acts may be subject to suspension “in the cases and under the conditions determined by regulatory law.” In other words, the Constitution reserves to the Amparo Law the authority to define the conditions for the preliminary injunction. Hence, the court concludes that the provisions of the Amparo Law cannot be subordinated to a provision contained in a different law, because it is those provisions that govern the interpretation and application of any other law with respect to constitutional proceedings.
The argument is sound and can be further strengthened by a point not mentioned in the analysis. The Amparo Law itself regulates exemptions from the requirement to provide guarantees: Article 7 exempts official legal entities from the obligation to provide the guarantees required by law of the parties. If the legislature expressly specified who is exempt, the absence of credit institutions from that list is significant and confirms that an exemption established in a law outside the amparo regime has no effect in that context.
The Applicability of Case Law P./J. 6/92
The court relies on the case law P./J. 6/92 of the Plenary Session of the Supreme Court (Eighth Era), titled “CREDIT INSTITUTIONS. ARE REQUIRED TO PROVIDE A GUARANTEE OR COUNTER-GUARANTEE IN CASES INVOLVING SUSPENSION, WHEN A DIRECT AMPARO IS SEEKED,” and holds that it remains applicable because its content does not conflict with current law, in accordance with Transitory Article 6 of the 2013 Amparo Law.
This raises an observation. If the Plenary’s case law remained in force and was binding on all courts under Article 217 of the Amparo Law, the emergence of a collegiate court ruling on the same issue reveals that the standard was not being applied uniformly, or that financial institutions found grounds to challenge its applicability under the new law. The practical utility of the new legal doctrine lies precisely in expressly settling that debate.
Scope: direct amparo, First Circuit, and a rationale that extends beyond
The precedent has two formal limitations. The first is territorial: pursuant to Article 217 of the Amparo Law, the case law of a collegiate court is binding on the courts within its circuit, with the exception of regional plenary sessions and the collegiate courts themselves. Outside Mexico City, its value is persuasive, except for the binding nature of P./J. 6/92. The second is substantive: the subject matter and the ruling pertain to direct amparo.
However, the ratio decidendi does not depend on characteristics specific to direct amparo. If the Amparo Law, by mandate of Article 107 of the Constitution, takes precedence over any other law regarding suspension, the reasoning naturally extends to suspension in indirect amparo and to the system of guarantees under Article 132. It is foreseeable that the argument will extend to that area, and that the issue will ultimately be raised as a conflict of legal principles before the competent regional plenary session or the Supreme Court.
It must also be clarified what this approach does not resolve. Article 86 remains fully effective outside of amparo proceedings—for example, with respect to preliminary injunctions, attachments, or bonds in ordinary proceedings. The ruling does not declare it inapplicable in general; it merely affirms that it cannot govern suspension in amparo proceedings.
Implications for Litigation with Credit Institutions
For the interested third party, the ruling allows them to demand that the suspension be conditional upon sufficient security and to challenge, through a complaint, both the failure to establish such security and an insufficient amount. In practice, the amount is typically quantified with reference to the statutory commercial interest rate and the likely time required to resolve the amparo proceeding; therefore, it is advisable to provide the necessary information for this calculation from the outset of the proceeding. It also preserves the option of offering counter-guarantee to obtain enforcement, when this is preferable.
For credit institutions, the cost of the stay is no longer zero. This requires them to weigh more carefully the advisability of suspending enforcement, especially in cases involving significant amounts, where the direct amparo had, in practice, functioned as a cost-free deferral mechanism.
The privilege under Article 86 is based on a presumption of solvency that the legislature intended to recognize for the banking system. However, the purpose of the security in the stay is not to establish the complainant’s solvency, but rather to compensate the interested third party for the delay in the enforcement of a judgment in their favor. From that perspective, the exemption was difficult to reconcile with the principle of procedural equality and with the right to the enforcement of judgments derived from Article 17 of the Constitution. The court resolved the conflict using the correct legal tool. It remains to be seen whether the same reasoning extends to indirect amparo and whether the standard holds outside the First Circuit.


