Direct Amparo in Review 6/2025 was attracted and will be proposed for resolution by the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation, under the opinion of Justice Lenia Batres Guadarrama. The case intends to resolve a novel legal issue: whether a work generated by an artificial intelligence (AI) system could be registered under Mexican copyright law and, if so, whether such AI could be legally recognized as an author. The Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice intends to discuss the issue on July 02, 2025.
The draft for resolution has possible serious adverse effects to the artificial intelligence ecosystem in Mexico, as it intends to determine that works derived from artificial intelligence not only are not susceptible of protection, but that they also become works of the public domain once created.
The matter originated from an application submitted to the National Institute of Copyright (INDAUTOR) by Gerald García Báez, who sought to register a Work titled “Avatar Virtual: Gerald García Báez,” created using an AI tool named “LEONARDO,” to which they provided specific parameters and personal images. In his application, he requested the recognition of economic rights in his favor as the system’s user and the attribution of moral rights to the AI, asserting that the AI independently carried out the creative process.
INDAUTOR rejected the application on the grounds that the work did not meet the requirement of human authorship established in the Federal Copyright Law (LFDA). This decision was upheld by the Specialized Intellectual Property Chamber of the Federal Court of Administrative Affairs (FCAA) in a judgment dated August 30, 2024. Consequently, the applicant filed a direct amparo lawsuit.
Following the rejection of registration and confirmation of the rejection, the petitioner filed a direct amparo before the Fifth Circuit Court for Administrative Matters of the First Circuit, and also requested the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation (SCJN) to exercise its power of attraction, arguing that the matter presented novel issues at the intersection of AI, intellectual property, and human rights. The Second Chamber of the SCJN agreed unanimously to take up the case and assigned the drafting of the ruling to Justice Lenia Batres Guadarrama.
Originally to be resolved by the Federal Circuit Courts, the Supreme Court of Justice attracted the case due to its national transcendence. In his claim, the petitioner stated that their role was limited to providing personal photographs and parameters for the AI to generate the avatar, and thus requested the recognition of economic rights in their favor as the system’s user, along with moral rights for the AI, considering it the entity that had performed the creative act. Petitioner argued that denying this recognition amounted to a restrictive, outdated, and discriminatory interpretation of the law, one that failed to address technological advances and the current socio-digital context. He even cited international precedents, such as the “DABUS” cases in South Africa and Australia, and claimed that articles 12 and 18 of the LFDA were unconstitutional for implicitly excluding non-human entities from being copyright holders.
Upon analyzing the merits of the case, the Chamber intends to hold that copyright, as a human right, can only be granted to natural persons, since it requires a manifestation of creativity, originality, and individuality grounded in consciousness, will, and intellect. Although AI systems may simulate creative processes, they lack subjectivity, cognitive experience, or emotional connection with the outcome. Thus, their products cannot qualify as “works” protected under current copyright law.
Regarding the petitioner’s request to attribute moral rights to the AI, the Chamber emphasized that such rights, including authorship, integrity, and the personal connection between author and work, are inherent to human dignity and cannot be conferred upon artificial entities. Furthermore, it rejected the petitioner’s claims of legal discrimination or unequal treatment, clarifying that the exclusion of non-human entities from the copyright regime is not arbitrary but based on rational and objective criteria supported by international law, such as the Berne Convention and opinions of the United Nations Human Rights Council.
Likewise, the Chamber dismissed the international precedents cited by the petitioner, stressing that these decisions are not binding within the Mexican legal system and must be interpreted in accordance with the principle of territoriality. It also noted that jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom and the United States have similarly denied recognition of AI systems as legal authors.
Lastly, the Supreme Court concluded that Articles 12 and 18 of the LFDA, challenged by the petitioner, do not violate the principles of equality, nor the rights to innovation or access to culture. The legal distinction between natural persons and artificial entities serves a constitutionally valid purpose: to safeguard human creative expression as a manifestation of intellect, personality, and dignity.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court also intends to hold in the resolutive points 99 to 103 of the resolution draft that artificial intelligence is an extension of the creative capacity of humanity and its products become part of the public domain. This can set a dangerous precedent to the fact that under this criterion, any work intervened with artificial intelligence can become public domain.
Accordingly, the Second Chamber found the claims of constitutional violation to be unfounded and resolved to deny the requested amparo, thereby upholding the constitutionality of the current legal framework and confirming the inadmissibility of registering AI-generated outputs as protected works under copyright law.
Under our interpretation, the decision intends to go beyond the scope of the issue by pointing out that any works intervened by artificial intelligence can become public dominion for it being an extension of human creativity. This could set a precedent of uncertainty a lack of legal certainty in which everything intervened by artificial intelligence, in one way or another, becomes public domain.
For more information in relation to the present communication or any other matter, do not hesitate in contact to our Intellectual Property department.
